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ABSTRACT 
 
 Initial public offering (IPO) companies are exempt from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, leaving investors to assess the quality of an IPO company’s internal controls, 
which affect the quality of management-provided financial information, without an opinion on 
internal controls effectiveness from management or the external auditor. When not engaged to 
opine on the effectiveness of internal controls, auditing standards permit auditors to voluntarily 
state that their opinion does not extend to internal control effectiveness. Given auditors’ limited 
ability to distinguish financial reporting quality in the unqualified audit report, the costly nature 
of audit report modifications, and auditors’ litigation risk concerns, these voluntarily audit report 
disclosures are likely informative as to the quality of internal controls. Using a sample of IPOs 
completed on United States equity exchanges from 2005 through 2014, I predict and find that the 
above-mentioned voluntary internal controls-related audit report disclosure is associated with a 
higher likelihood of post-IPO auditor-reported internal control deficiencies, lower IPO offer 
prices, lower post-IPO earnings, and increased post-IPO returns-based risk. These associations 
are robust to addressing the endogenous nature of the auditor’s disclosure decision. Overall, my 
results suggest that auditor voluntary disclosures are informative. This research should be of 
interest to investors, regulators tasked with reforming the audit reporting model, and legislators 
who recently passed Title I of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act that exempts qualifying 
IPO companies from Section 404(b) reporting requirements for up to five years. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This study examines the information content of voluntary audit report disclosures 
pertaining to internal controls over financial reporting (ICOFR) among initial public offering 
(IPO) companies. While IPO companies are exempt from Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOx), which requires auditors to opine on management’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of ICOFR for many public companies, auditors are still required to consider 
internal controls in the conduct of their audit. When not engaged to opine on ICOFR, in addition 
to the omission of an opinion on ICOFR, auditors can voluntarily state in the audit report that 
their opinion on the financial statements does not include an opinion on the effectiveness of 
ICOFR (PCAOB 2001). Absent an explicit opinion on the effectiveness of ICOFR, non-standard 
audit report disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550 (hereafter “AU 9550 disclosure”) is 
not likely to convey new literal information. However, the current unqualified audit report does 
not provide an explicit outlet to publicly communicate internal control deficiencies when not 
engaged to opine on ICOFR.1 Therefore, given its voluntary nature and limited alternatives for 
distinguishing financial reporting quality in the unqualified audit report, AU 9550 disclosure is 
likely informative. 
 Studying the informativeness of AU 9550 disclosure added to the audit report in the IPO 
registration statement is important for at least two reasons. One, neither management, nor the 
external auditor, is required to opine on a company’s internal control effectiveness at the time of 
the IPO. Accelerated filers must opine on internal control effectiveness in accordance with SOx 
as of the second fiscal year end after the IPO. So, while the intent of Section 404 of SOx is to 
                                                        
1 In a financial statement audit, the auditor can overcome internal control deficiencies through additional substantive 
testing in order to issue an unqualified opinion. 
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improve the reliability of information public companies provide to the financial markets (COSO 
2006; PCAOB 2004), it does not apply to IPOs companies, whose investors may benefit most 
from the enhanced reporting requirements due to the lack of public financial reporting history. 
 The non-applicability of SOx to IPO companies is likely based on consideration of the 
legislation’s significant compliance cost, especially for smaller companies. Despite delayed 
compliance, SOx’s cost has been linked to the significant decline in IPOs since 2000 (Gao, 
Ritter, and Zhu 2013), prompting legislators to pass Title I of the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act in 2012. Title I created a new class of registrant, called an emerging growth 
company, that completes a modified IPO process and is exempt from the requirements of Section 
404(b) of SOx for up to five years (PCAOB 2013).2 The Section 404(b) exemption is noteworthy 
because material weakness disclosures are more informative for companies that are smaller and 
likely have higher pre-disclosure information asymmetry (e.g., IPO companies) (Beneish, 
Billings, and Hodder 2008).3 The JOBS Act makes it more imperative for investors to identify 
timely sources of information for insight into the current and future internal control effectiveness 
of an emerging growth company, knowing that an explicit opinion from the auditor may not be 
available for up to five years. Pre-IPO AU 9550 disclosure may serve as a potentially discerning 
source of information pertaining to the effectiveness of ICOFR, as revealed through its 
                                                        
2 An emerging growth company had less than $1.0 billion in annual revenue during its most recently completed 
fiscal year and may take advantage of any one or more of the following accommodations: meet with certain 
institutional investors to gauge interest in a contemplated offering; receive an initial confidential review of the 
registration statement from the SEC; present only two (rather than three) years of audited financial statements in the 
registration statement and two (rather than five) years of selected financial data; exempt from the internal controls 
audit required by Section 404(b) of SOx; provide streamlined executive compensation disclosure and exempt from 
shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation; use private company phase-in periods for new accounting 
standards; and, exempt from PCAOB rules pertaining to auditor rotation and proposed auditor discussion and 
analysis. An emerging growth company maintains its status for up to five years after its IPO date. 
3 Barth, Landsman, and Taylor (2014) examine emerging growth company IPOs and do not find any of the 158 
companies sampled to voluntarily comply with Section 404(b) of SOx. 
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associations with post-IPO auditor-reported internal control deficiencies, IPO offer pricing, and 
post-IPO earnings and risk. 
  Two, the informativeness of non-standard audit report content under current auditing 
standards is unclear. Financial statement users often state that the standard U.S. audit report is 
uninformative unless it contains a going concern uncertainty (e.g., Humphrey, Loft, and Woods 
2009; Gray, Turner, Coram, and Mock 2011). Prior research provides mixed evidence on the 
informativeness of required or recommended audit report modifications (e.g., Czerney, Schmidt, 
and Thompson 2014a, b; Butler, Leone, and Willenborg 2004; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 
2001; Francis and Krishnan 1999). Practitioner views and academic researchers’ evidence have 
motivated the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to consider reforms to the 
audit reporting model in an effort to make it more informative (PCAOB 2013). One such 
proposed reform would require the auditor to discuss some of the risks and uncertainties 
encountered in the conduct of the audit. There has been limited research, however, on voluntary 
audit report modifications, which may be differentially informative in comparison to required 
modifications due to their non-requisite nature.4 This is especially true in the IPO setting where 
the scarcity of publicly available information and abundance of informational asymmetries 
(Willenborg 1999) make the auditor a more significant information intermediary, relative to the 
high information and liquidity environments in which established U.S. public companies 
operate.5  
                                                        
4 Concurrent work by Harris, Omer, and Tanyi (2014) examines disclosures on the role of a component audit firm in 
the audit. My research differs from theirs in that they focus on voluntary language in accordance with AU Section 
543, as opposed to AU Section 9550, not strictly in the IPO setting, and are interested solely in the financial 
reporting quality implications.   
5 The IPO setting is also an advantageous one in which to study the information content of AU 9550 disclosure 
because, whereas investors in established public companies after the passage of SOx expect the auditors to opine on 
ICOFR, the expectation for IPO companies is that ICOFR was not audited. Therefore, AU 9550 disclosure is more 
likely to convey new information regarding the scope of the auditor’s work for established companies than for IPO 
companies.  
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 Audit report modifications are costly to auditors because they can strain the auditor-client 
relationship and increase the risk of losing the client as a revenue source. AU 9550 disclosure is 
a modification to the standard unqualified audit report and, due to its voluntary and costly nature, 
is likely added for consequential reasons, suggesting that it is informative. Specifically, AU 9550 
disclosure may be provided when internal controls are poor, in an effort to disassociate the 
auditor from the underlying causes of a possible future financial reporting failure that could 
trigger a lawsuit in the already high litigation IPO environment.  
 Considering the costly nature of audit report modifications and auditor litigation risk 
concerns, I make four directional predictions pertaining to the effects of AU 9550 disclosure. 
One, AU 9550 disclosure is associated with an increased likelihood of post-IPO Section 404(b) 
material weaknesses. The premise for this expectation is that companies are less likely than 
auditors to detect internal control deficiencies (Bedard and Graham 2011). As well, resource 
constrained companies are less likely to remediate internal control deficiencies (Bedard, Hoitash, 
Hoitash, and Westermann 2012). Therefore, poor (or non-existent) pre-IPO internal controls that 
motivate AU 9550 disclosure will persist until the auditor’s Section 404(b) audit, required in the 
second fiscal year after the IPO (at the earliest). Two, I predict that AU 9550 disclosure is 
negatively associated with IPO offer prices, as the perceived reliability of financial information 
is lower when internal controls are not audited. Three, I expect AU 9550 disclosure that reflects 
poor internal controls is associated with lower post-IPO earnings. Strong internal controls 
enhance the quality of information systems that generate the data management uses to make 
resource allocation decisions (Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007). Poor internal controls, then, 
can contribute to the misallocation of resources and may require companies to divert resources to 
improve internal controls, leading to lower future financial performance. Four, AU 9550 
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disclosure, as a form of enhanced disclosure that suggests poor financial information quality, is 
associated with increased post-IPO risk. For this prediction, I draw on prior research that finds 
associations between internal control deficiencies and company risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and Lafond 2009; Beneish, Billings, and Hodder 2008) and companies’ disclosure 
practices and perceived riskiness (Lang and Lundholm 1993). 
 To test my hypotheses, I analyze the text of the audit report included in the S-1 or F-1 
filing for a sample of IPOs completed on U.S. stock exchanges between 2005 and 2014 to 
identify reports that contain AU 9550 disclosure. I then test whether AU 9550 disclosure is 
informative as to future auditor-reported ICOFR deficiencies, IPO offer prices, future earnings, 
and post-IPO risk. I find that AU 9550 disclosure added to the audit report included in the 
registration statement is associated with an increased likelihood of post-IPO auditor-reported 
ICOFR deficiencies. I also find that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with lower IPO offer 
prices, using three complementary measures of the IPO offer price: the midpoint of the pre-IPO 
offer price range; the final IPO offer price; and, the price of the IPO company’s stock at the close 
of the first day of trading. Finally, I find that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with lower future 
earnings and increased post-IPO risk. In an additional analysis, I confirm that my results with 
respect to AU 9550 disclosure are robust to addressing the endogenous nature of the auditor’s 
decision to add such disclosure. Overall, I provide robust evidence that AU 9550 disclosure is 
informative as to internal controls quality, financial information quality, and IPO company 
performance and risk.6   
 My research makes three primary contributions to the accounting literature. One, I 
contribute to the literature on IPO disclosures. Prior research finds that management-provided 
voluntary disclosures are useful in the evaluation of IPO companies (e.g., Guo, Lev, and Zhou 
                                                        
6 Ritter (1984, p. 221) argues that, in the IPO context, risk relates to informational differences. 
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2004; Leone, Rock, and Willenborg 2007; Schrand and Verrecchia 2002). Auditor-provided 
required disclosures are also informative to IPO investors (e.g. Willenborg and McKeown 2001; 
Ghicas, Papadaki, Siougle, and Sougiannis 2008). My research extends the disclosure literature 
by studying the information content of AU 9550 disclosure, as a unique type of non-management 
voluntary disclosure, for IPO companies. Studying non-management voluntary disclosure is 
important because limited involvement by third parties in pre-IPO companies makes it difficult 
for investors to assess the credibility of management voluntary disclosures.  
 Two, I contribute to the internal controls literature. Prior studies have analyzed the 
determinants (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2007; Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007b) 
and consequences (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond 2009; Doyle, Ge, and 
McVay 2007a) of material weaknesses in ICOFR. I extend this line of research by identifying the 
inclusion of AU 9550 disclosure in the pre-IPO audit report as a prospective factor that is 
incrementally informative of future financial reporting quality, earnings, and risk. This result is 
noteworthy because it suggests that more subtle auditor-provided information, as opposed to 
unambiguous significant deficiencies or material weaknesses, is relevant to the assessment of 
information quality and internal controls. My results should be of interest to legislators who 
passed Title I of the JOBS Act, which postpones the public communication of material 
weaknesses in ICOFR that may reasonably be known at the time of the IPO. My findings suggest 
that in passing Title I, legislators weighed public companies’ compliance cost concerns more 
heavily than the potential cost of unaudited control systems to investors.  
 Three, I contribute to the literature on the information content of the audit report in two 
key ways. One, I study previously unexamined AU 9550 disclosure, which answers the call from 
Church, Davis, and McCracken (2008) for further research on the effect of different disclosures 
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in the audit report. My research can inform the ongoing discussion regarding requiring auditors 
or management to explicitly state whether or not the company has obtained an attestation on 
internal controls from the auditor, in an effort to increase transparency and investor protection 
(GAO 2013). Two, I am the first, to my knowledge, to study the information content of the audit 
report for IPO companies strictly in the post-SOx regulatory environment characterized by 
heightened skepticism of both new issuances and auditors. Studying this time period is important 
because auditors’ communications may be differentially informative under PCAOB regulation 
versus self-regulated regimes.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized into four additional chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
background information and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 details the sample selection 
procedure and research design. I review my empirical results in Chapter 4 and, in Chapter 5, I 
discuss additional analyses performed and the results thereof. My conclusions are presented in 
Chapter 6.    
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 AU Section 9550 
 I utilize the non-standard audit report content provided in accordance with AU Section 
9550 as a mechanism to study the information content of auditor voluntary disclosures. Although 
an IPO company’s auditor is not required to opine on the effectiveness of ICOFR, professional 
standards require the auditor to obtain a detailed understanding of internal controls in order to 
assess control risk, which impacts the nature, timing, and extent of substantive audit procedures 
underlying the opinion on the fair presentation of the financial statements (Asare, Fitzgerald, 
Graham, Joe, Negangard, and Wolfe 2013). This detailed understanding of the internal control 
environment not only impacts the conduct of the financial statement audit, but may also 
influence the auditor’s decision to provide voluntary disclosure in the audit report, following AU 
Section 9550. AU Section 9550 permits the addition of non-standard content to the audit report 
when the auditor does not opine on effectiveness of ICOFR. Specifically, AU Section 9550.10 
states that the auditor may consider adding, but is not required to add, the following disclosure to 
the standard unqualified audit report:  
“We were not engaged to examine management’s assertion about the effectiveness of 
[name of entity’s] internal control over financial reporting as of [date] included in the 
accompanying [title of management’s report] and, accordingly, we do not express an 
opinion thereon.” 
 
Refer to Appendix A for examples of AU 9550 disclosure from IPO companies in my sample. 
  
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure in the IPO Setting 
 Enhanced disclosure is one way to reduce information asymmetry in IPOs. The extent of 
voluntary disclosures is associated with lower post-IPO information asymmetry (Guo, Lev, and 
Zhou 2004) and disclosure specificity in IPO registration statements reduces ex ante uncertainty 
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(Leone, Rock, and Willenborg 2007). Voluntary company-provided news disclosures outside 
regulatory filings are associated with less underpricing for companies with the highest first-day 
returns (Schrand and Verrecchia 2002). The limited information available from third party 
sources for IPO companies (Aharony, Lin, and Loeb 1993; Friedlan 1994), however, makes it 
difficult to judge the appropriateness of reported accounting numbers (Fan 1997). When other 
outlets do not provide credible information, the audit report becomes particularly useful (Church 
et al. 2008). Collectively, these results indicate that disclosure (particularly voluntary disclosure) 
is informative for IPO companies, but its impact on information asymmetry is limited when the 
disclosures are unverified.  
   Auditors, as third party information intermediaries, play a key role in shaping a 
company’s information environment and enhance the credibility of disclosed information (Beyer, 
Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). They reduce information asymmetry in IPOs by opining on the 
financial statements included in the registration statement and ensuring that material facts in 
regulatory filings are properly disclosed (Willenborg 1999). Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991) 
analytically show that the content of the audit report is informative when higher audit quality is 
more costly. Subsequent empirical research supports this result, as going concern opinions 
(Willenborg and McKeown 2001) and “quantifiable qualifications” in international equity 
markets (Ghicas, Papadaki, Siougle, and Sougiannis 2008) are informative for IPO companies.7 
In sum, audit report content is informative for IPO companies, but empirical tests to date have 
been restricted to required auditor disclosures. My research adds to this literature by exploring 
the informativeness of auditor-provided AU 9550 disclosure – a form of voluntary, non-
management-provided disclosure.  
                                                        
7 Ghicas et al. (2008, p. 513) define “quantifiable qualifications” as “monetary amounts missing or misstated on the 
financial statements but disclosed in the auditor’s report.” A comparable qualification does not exist under U.S. 
auditing standards.  
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2.3 Audit Report Informativeness 
 The audit report is the outcome of a negotiation between management and the auditor 
(Antle and Nalebuff 1991; Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb 2001), during which auditors must 
balance client preferences against their fiduciary duty to act in the interest of financial market 
constituents. Companies are more likely to terminate their auditor after the auditor issues an 
audit report containing non-standard content (e.g. Chow and Rice 1982; Mutchler 1984; Geiger, 
Raghunandan, and Rama 1998), suggesting a company preference for a standard unqualified 
audit report and potential adverse consequences to the auditor for issuing a non-standard report. 
Financial statement users’ tendencies to limit their review of the audit report to whether or not it 
is unqualified reinforce this client preference (Gray et al. 2011). The auditor’s relationship with 
the company influences her likelihood of including not only adverse non-standard content in the 
audit report (Lennox 2005; Ye, Carson, and Simnett 2011), but also non-standard content that 
could be perceived unfavorably.8 The payment of audit fees from the company to the auditor 
strengthens the company’s potential influence on the auditor (DeFond and Francis 2005; Francis 
2006). To the extent non-standard audit report disclosure influences companies’ auditor retention 
decisions or audit fees, non-standard audit report disclosure is costly and as a result, when 
voluntary, is not likely added for trivial reasons.  
 Public companies’ audit reports are generally “boilerplate” (Gray et al. 2011), conveying 
little of the auditor’s vast private information, due to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) requirement for all audit reports to be unqualified. Auditors can leverage the voluntary 
                                                        
8 Financial statement users do not fully understand auditors’ responsibilities (Church et al. 2008), which could be 
due, in part, to their inability to process the content of the audit report. Investors generally find, “The [audit] report 
is useful if one can read between the lines … sometimes there are nuances, which can let the careful reader note the 
state of affairs is not as it should be” (CFA 2011, p. 9). Unsophisticated investors merely observe that a disclosure 
has been made without being able to infer the value of the disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty 2003) and may not 
recognize the nuanced nature of the audit report. A lack of understanding as to the auditor’s responsibilities can lead 
financial statement users to perceive AU 9550 disclosure as conveying new information that a Section 404(b) audit 
was not conducted.   
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nature of AU Section 9550 to distinguish financial reporting and disclosure quality, the 
foundations of which are internal controls, in the unqualified audit report. I expect auditors to 
voluntarily include AU 9550 disclosure in the audit report when internal controls are poor, in 
response to auditors’ heightened litigation risk exposure for IPOs relative to existing public 
companies (Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008).9 Auditor litigation risk stems from the 
higher likelihood of being sued as a result of a failure in financial reporting (Palmrose 1987, 
1988; Stice 1991; Lys and Watts 1994). Enhanced disclosure is an effective hedge against all 
types of litigation (Hanley and Hoberg 2012), with AU 9550 disclosure being a form of 
enhanced auditor disclosure. As such, auditors’ AU 9550 disclosure can reduce litigation risk by 
disassociating the auditor from the poor internal controls underlying financial reporting failures 
that trigger future lawsuits.  
2.4 Hypothesis Development 
2.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
 The first hypothesis predicts a positive association between AU 9550 disclosure and post-
IPO auditor-reported material weaknesses. Private (pre-IPO) companies typically have weaker 
internal controls than public companies (Gray et al. 2011). Although private companies may 
have internal processes in place to evaluate internal controls, weaker controls persist because, 
relative to auditors, companies tend to neither detect (and correct) as many internal control 
deficiencies, nor detect deficiencies most-likely to affect financial reporting (Bedard and Graham 
2011). As IPO companies transition from private to public companies, many must improve their 
control environments to meet the higher standard for public companies.   
                                                        
9 Venkataraman et al. note that companies register their IPO under the Securities Act of 1933 but, after going public, 
file under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Litigation risk exposure is higher under the 1933 Act than under the 
1934 Act because the 1933 Act, in effect, imposes strict liability on issuers for material misstatements or omissions 
in a registration statement. Comparatively, under the 1934 Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an issuer knowingly 
misled investors. 
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 The auditor can informally communicate observations on the company’s ICOFR from its 
pre-IPO financial statement audit to management or the audit committee, providing a starting 
point for improvement efforts. However, resource-constrained companies, such as IPO 
companies, are less likely to remediate control problems that involve significant resources, 
especially large capital investments (Bedard et al. 2012). Control deficiencies not remediated 
will become reportable conditions in the auditor’s opinion on the effectiveness of ICOFR. 
 I expect AU 9550 disclosure that reflects the auditor’s lack of comfort with the 
effectiveness of ICOFR to be associated with an increased likelihood of auditor-identified 
internal control deficiencies in the first year after the IPO in which the auditor renders a Section 
404(b) opinion. I formally state H1, in the alternative form, as follows:  
H1: AU Section 9550 audit report disclosure is associated with an increased likelihood
 of post-IPO auditor-reported ICOFR deficiencies.  
 
2.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis predicts a negative association between AU 9550 disclosure and 
IPO offer pricing. The company and its underwriters typically set the final offer price after 
market close on the day before the offering (Lowry and Schwert 2004), taking into consideration 
investors’ perceptions of the issue gleaned from the road show (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). 
The offer price is set without the company or its underwriters knowing precisely what the 
market’s valuation of the stock will be (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). IPO issuers’ information 
advantage over investors (Ritter and Welch 2002; Demers and Joos 2007) and absence of a 
reference market price prior to the IPO (Friedlan 1994) make it difficult for investors to evaluate 
an IPO (Ritter and Welch 2002; Demers and Joos 2007). Information asymmetry between the 
company and investors can lead prospective investors to discount their valuation (Myers and 
Majluf 1984). 
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 Accounting information is a key source of non-price information used to evaluate the IPO 
offer price (Friedlan 1994). Auditors reduce the information asymmetry between the company 
and prospective investors by certifying the financial information management provides. The 
auditor’s influence on the reliability of the financial information may be limited, however, 
because she is not required to conduct an audit of internal controls in accordance with Section 
404(b) of SOx, the intent of which is to improve the reliability of information public companies 
provide (COSO 2006; PCAOB 2004). AU 9550 disclosure stating that a SOx audit was not 
conducted suggests that the reliability of financial statement information provided is lower, and 
risk stemming from the likelihood that company-specific information is of poor quality is 
relevant for pricing decisions (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005).10 Accordingly, I 
expect AU 9550 disclosure to be associated with lower IPO offer pricing and formally state my 
expectation as H2, in the alternative form, as follows:   
H2: AU Section 9550 audit report disclosure is associated with lower IPO offer prices. 
2.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
 
 AU 9550 disclosure may be associated with lower post-IPO earnings. The quality of 
information systems, of which the effectiveness of internal controls is a key component, directly 
affects the quality of the financial data available for informed decision-making (Lambert et al. 
2007). Managers relying on incomplete or inaccurate information face more uncertainty. A good 
internal control system can improve the accuracy of disclosures and other decisions made using 
internal financial data (Feng, Li, and McVay 2009) by providing more timely, complete, and 
accurate financial information. ICOFR, therefore, can have an economically significant effect on 
company operations (Feng, Li, McVay, and Ashbaugh-Skaife 2014). Specifically, Cheng, 
                                                        
10 Ecker (2014) finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that information precision at the time of the IPO is 
unknown to investors and, therefore, must be estimated with considerable error due to the little or no public 
information history about a company’s fundamentals. 
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Dhaliwal, and Zhang (2013) show that investment inefficiency is mitigated after the disclosure of 
ICOFR weaknesses. Ultimately, AU 9550 disclosure, as a proxy for poor internal controls, is 
likely associated with lower future earnings due to internal controls’ adverse impact on earnings 
through poorer quality internal decision-making and through the diversion of financial resources 
to improve the internal control environment.  
 The effect of internal control quality can also influence future earnings through its impact 
on the quality of accruals. Internal control weaknesses are associated with poorly estimated 
accruals that are not subsequently realized as cash flows (Doyle et al. 2007a). As well, in the 
presence in of Section 404 internal control deficiencies, management tends to guide (Feng, Li, 
and McVay 2009), and analysts tend to forecast (Clinton, Pinello, and Skaife 2014), less 
accurately, suggesting that earnings are more difficult to forecast when internal controls are poor. 
In sum, I expect AU 9550 disclosure that reflects poor internal controls to be associated with 
lower future earnings. I formally state my prediction as follows:  
H3: AU Section 9550 audit report disclosure is associated with lower post-IPO
 earnings. 
 
2.4.4 Hypothesis 4 
 
 AU 9550 disclosure may also be associated with increased post-IPO risk. Material 
weakness disclosures are associated with significantly negative stock returns (Beneish et al. 
2008; Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare 2008), indicating that these disclosures are 
informative to equity investors. Companies with internal control deficiencies have significantly 
higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; 
Beneish et al. 2008). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. interpret this result as demonstrating the link 
between financial information quality and risk. Increases in the perceived riskiness of a company 
are important because they can raise the cost of capital (Froot, Perold, and Stein 1992). Lang and 
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Lundholm (1993) find that assessments of corporate disclosure practices are positively 
associated with companies’ return volatility – a measure of perceived riskiness. It follows that 
voluntary AU 9550 disclosure, a form of enhanced auditor disclosure, may be associated with 
increased risk, especially to the extent that it suggests poor financial information quality.  
 I formally state my predictions for the associations between AU 9550 disclosure and 
post-IPO risk, in the alternative form, as follows:  
H4: AU Section 9550 audit report disclosure is associated with higher post-IPO risk. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 I analyze the content of the audit report included in the registration statement for a 
sample of 1,669 IPOs completed on U.S. public equity exchanges from January 1, 2005 through 
mid 2014 to identify the presence of AU Section 9550 disclosure. I use a Python script to 
download IPO data from www.nasdaq.com.11 I restrict my analysis to companies that originally 
file their registration statement with the SEC on form S-1 or F-1. Consistent with prior IPO 
research and to limit the influence of economically small outliers on my results, I exclude 109 
observations with missing IPO offer prices or prices less than $5 per share and 328 observations 
with pre-IPO total assets of less than $1,000,000 (inclusive) or missing. The audit report could 
not be extracted from the registration statement for 125 observations. I exclude 16 IPOs with pre-
IPO Section 404(b) audit reports because I am interested in studying a setting where explicit 
auditor-provided information on the effectiveness of ICOFR is not available at the time of the 
IPO. Finally, I exclude 8 IPOs of non-operating companies (Standard Industrial Classification 
Code 9995). After these exclusions, the sample of IPOs eligible for my multivariate analyses is 
1,083. The final sample size for my test of H1 is 549 because AuditAnalytics does not contain 
SOx Section 404(b) data for 339 observations, Section 404(b) data is not available within 27 
months of the IPO date for 40 observations, and data necessary to compute control variables is 
missing for 155 observations. 12  The sample size for my test of H2 is 1,045 due to 38 
                                                        
11 www.nasdaq.com includes data for IPOs completed on multiple U.S. equity exchanges, including the NASDAQ, 
New York, and American Stock Exchanges, as well as on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board. 
12 New registrants are not required to comply with Section 404(b) of SOx until their second annual report filed as a 
public company. I restrict my analysis to 27 months after the IPO to include two full years, plus three months that it 
typically takes to prepare annual financial statements. My results are unchanged when I include the 40 observations 
with delayed compliance.    
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observations lacking data necessary to compute control variables. The final sample for my test of 
H3 contains 866 observations because 58 observations have pre-IPO return on assets of less than 
-100 percent, Compustat data is not available for 26 observations for a fiscal year ending within 
a year after the IPO, and 133 observations are missing data for control variables. The final 
sample for my test of H4 includes 834 observations, as CRSP data was missing for 234 
observations and data was not available for control variables for 15 observations.  
3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
3.2.1 Material Weakness Model 
 I test H1, which predicts an increased likelihood of auditor-reported material weaknesses 
in ICOFR when the audit report included in the IPO registration statement includes AU 9550 
disclosure, using a logistic regression model where ICDEF404_A is the dependent variable and 
AU9550 is the independent variable of interest, as follows: 
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐹404_𝐴 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈9550 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈508𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈508𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝐴 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝐴 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑌_𝐴 + 𝛽7𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑉𝐴𝐿404_𝐴) +
𝛽9𝑆𝑄𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑆_𝐴 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝐴) + 𝛽11𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁404 +
𝛽12𝐶𝐻𝐺𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅_𝐴 + 𝛽13𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂_𝐴 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐴) + 𝛽15𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 +
𝛽16𝐴𝑆5_404_𝐴 + 𝜀                 (1) 
 
ICDEF404_A is an indicator variable that equals one if the audit report identifies an ICOFR 
deficiency in the first fiscal year (after the IPO) the auditor opines on the effectiveness of 
ICOFR, and zero otherwise. The independent variable of interest, AU9550, is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the audit report included in the registration statement states that the 
auditor was not engaged to audit the effectiveness of ICOFR and, accordingly does not express 
an opinion thereon, and zero otherwise. I identify the presence of AU 9550 disclosure using text-
parsing routines that search for keywords and phrases in the audit report that are indicative of 
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internal control-related scope limitations. I manually validate the accuracy of my analysis for a 
sample of audit reports.  
 AU508OTHER and AU508GC control for other non-standard content in the audit report. 
AU Section 508.11 identifies eight circumstances that require the auditor to add non-standard 
language to the audit report. One circumstance is when there exists substantial doubt about the 
company’s ability to continue as a going concern. The other circumstances convey information 
relevant to non-viability risks that may also be important considerations in the IPO context. 
Accordingly, I control for these other types of non-standard audit report language. 
AU508OTHER is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit report contains non-standard 
content, other than a going concern uncertainty, in accordance with AU Section 508, and zero 
otherwise. AU508GC is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit report expresses substantial 
doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern, and zero otherwise. I identify 
the presence of AU Section 508 content using text-parsing procedures consistent with Czerney et 
al. (2014a, b). While AU9550, AU508OTHER, and AU508GC are measured using the content of 
the audit report in the IPO registration statement, all other regression variables are calculated as 
of (for) the fiscal year end(ed) in which the auditor opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR. 
  The control variables in this model follow Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Doyle et al. 
(2007b). I control for companies’ financial soundness using an indicator variable that equals one 
if the company reports a loss, and zero otherwise (LOSS), the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (CRATIO_A), and the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress measure (ZSCORE_A). I 
control for company size with the market value of equity as of fiscal year end (MKTVAL404_A). 
I measure organizational complexity with the square root of the number of employees at the 
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company as of fiscal year end (SQEMPLOYEES_A) and the natural logarithm of the number of 
geographic segments (Log(SEGMENTS_A)).  
 I control for the auditor’s ability to identify internal control deficiencies and incentives to 
disclose material weaknesses using four measures. BIGN404 equals one if the company’s auditor 
that issues the first opinion on ICOFR in accordance with Section 404(b) is Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, or PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and zero otherwise. CHGAUDITOR_A equals one 
if the auditor that opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR is different from the auditor that signs 
the audit report included in the IPO registration statement, and zero otherwise. I measure the 
economic bond between the company and auditor using the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
(NAFRATIO_A) and the natural logarithm of the total audit fees (Log(AUDITFEES_A)) to 
control for any potential economic bonding and auditor effort.  
 Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), I control for heightened litigation risk 
using an indicator variable that equals one if the company is in a high litigation risk industry, and 
zero otherwise (LITRISK). I identify high litigation risk industries following Venkataraman et al. 
(2008). Finally, I include an indicator variable associated with the passage of Auditing Standard 
No. 5 (AS5_404_A) that equals one if the period end date of the first audit report that includes an 
opinion on ICOFR is on or after November 15, 2007, and zero otherwise. I winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Refer to Appendix B for further 
discussion of variable construction and data sources.  
3.2.2 Offer Price Model 
 H2 predicts that the presence of AU 9550 disclosure in the audit report is negatively 
associated with the IPO offer price. To test H2, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate 
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the following model expanded from the accounting-based IPO valuation model in Bartov, 
Mohanram, and Seethamraju (2002): 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈9550 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈508𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈508𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑆) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑃𝑂_𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅) +
𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑉 + 𝛽11𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐵𝑉 + 𝛽12𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽13𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑆 +
𝛽14𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷_𝐴𝐷𝐽 + 𝛽15𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽16𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽17𝐴𝑆5 + 𝛽18𝐷𝑂𝐷𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 +
𝛽19𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 + 𝜀           (2)  
 
IPOPRICE is the final IPO offer price per share. AU9550 is the independent variable of interest. 
In addition to controlling for the other non-standard content in the audit report using 
AU508OTHER and AU508GC, I control for the quality of the company’s auditor using an 
indicator variable that equals one if the company’s auditor is Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
or PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and zero otherwise (BIGN). I include a measure for the quality of 
the auditor because a company’s independent auditor is a key member of its IPO expert advisor 
team. Underwriters encourage filing companies to engage a high-quality auditor to protect their 
reputations (Simunic and Stein 1987). IPO companies with prestigious underwriters are more 
likely to change to more credible auditors (Menon and Williams 1994), with the demand for 
high-quality auditors increasing with firm risk (Copley and Douthett, 2002). In the end, the 
quality of an IPO company’s auditor can impact the IPO offer price.   
 The company’s underwriters play a critical role in the IPO’s pricing. IPO companies 
benefit from including more underwriters in the IPO syndicate (Corwin and Schultz 2005). I 
control for the size of the underwriting syndicate using the number of non-lead underwriters 
(UNDERWRITERS).  
 A company’s preparedness to complete an IPO can impact the time it takes to complete 
its IPO. The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance reviews all IPO registration statements and 
communicates areas for improvement to the company in the form of a comment letter, to which 
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the company must respond with an amended registration statement. There can be several 
iterations of comments (Ertimur and Nondorf 2006) and comments have varying remediation 
costs depending on the accounting issue (Cassell, Dreher, and Myers 2013), suggesting that a 
longer IPO period has a negative impact on the offer price. Alternatively, a longer IPO period 
provides underwriters with more time for bookbuilding activities that can increase the demand, 
and ultimately offer price, for the IPO. Consistent with Loughran and McDonald (2013), I 
control for the length of the IPO period with IPO_LENGTH, which equals the number of days 
between the filing of the registration statement and IPO offer date.  
 Companies seeking to raise a predetermined amount of capital through the IPO can trade 
off the price at which they offer their shares with the number of shares offered. Consistent with 
Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010), I control for the number of shares issued in the IPO 
(SHARES_OFFER).   
 Next, I include several control variables following Bartov et al. (2002). POSEPS 
(NEGEPS) equals earnings per share for positive (non-positive) pre-IPO earnings, and zero 
otherwise. Earnings per share is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items for the last 
fiscal year ended prior to the IPO divided by total shares outstanding after the IPO. POSBV 
(NEGBV) equals book value of equity per share for positive (non-positive) pre-IPO book value 
of equity, and zero otherwise. Book value per share is calculated as common shareholders’ 
equity as of the last fiscal year end prior to the IPO divided by total shares outstanding after the 
IPO. FLOAT equals the total number of shares offered in the IPO relative to total shares 
outstanding after the IPO. RDPS is research and development per share, calculated as research 
and development expenses for the last fiscal year ended prior to the IPO divided by total shares 
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outstanding after the IPO. Finally, NASD_ADJ is the level of the NASDAQ exchange on the IPO 
date, adjusted for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index.  
 I include two industry-based controls. One, litigation risk is a relevant consideration for 
IPO pricing (Tinic 1988; Hughes and Thakor 1992), so I include LITRISK. Two, significantly 
different IPO failure models apply to technology companies than to non-technology companies 
(Demers and Joos 2007) and there are noticeable differences between the valuation models for 
Internet and non-Internet companies (Bartov et al. 2002). Accordingly, TECH is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the company belongs to one of the technology industries Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) identify, and zero otherwise.  
 Finally, I control for time period effects associated with the implementation of Auditing 
Standard No. 5 and passing of the Dodd-Frank and JOBS Acts.13 AS5 equals one if the audit 
report included in the registration statement is for a period ended on or after November 15, 2007, 
and zero otherwise. DODDFRANK equals one if the company’s IPO date is on or after the date 
the Dodd-Frank Act was passed (July 21, 2010), and zero otherwise. JOBS equals one if the 
company’s IPO date is on or after the date the JOBS Act was passed (April 5, 2012), and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. 
3.2.3 Earnings Forecast Model 
 H3 predicts a negative association between AU 9550 disclosure and post-IPO earnings. 
To test H3, I use OLS to estimate an accounting-based earnings prediction model modified from 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), in which return on assets (ROA) represents a scaled 
measure of earnings. My multivariate model is as follows: 
                                                        
13 Beyond the pragmatic reasons for controlling for time period effects using indicators for these three events that 
greatly impacted internal controls evaluation and IPO activity, I use this approach because the inclusion of year 
indicators in this model and Model 4 raise severe multicollinearity concerns. 
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈9550 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈508𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈508𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑒 +
𝛽5𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑇) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀         (3) 
 
 AU9550 is my independent variable of interest. My dependent variable (ROApost) is return 
on assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO. I calculate return on assets using net income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. I control for the other non-standard content in 
the audit report included in the IPO registration statement using AU508OTHER and AU508GC, 
as previously defined. ROApre equals return on assets for the last fiscal year ended prior to the 
IPO. NWCpre equals net working capital, calculated as total current assets (excluding cash and 
cash equivalents) less total current liabilities, scaled by total assets. LEVERAGEpre equals total 
liabilities divided by total assets. ATpre equals total assets for the last fiscal year ended prior to the 
IPO. Lastly, I control for the gross proceeds from the IPO, which may be reinvested in the 
business to increase future earnings. I calculate gross proceeds as the IPO offer price per share 
times the number of shares issued (OFFER_AMT).  
3.2.4 Risk Model 
 H4 predicts that the presence of AU 9550 disclosure in the audit report is associated with 
increased post-IPO risk. To test H4, I use OLS to estimate the following model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈9550 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈508𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈508𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑆) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑃𝑂_𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻) + 𝛽7𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 +
𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑉𝐴𝐿) + 𝛽11𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽12𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽13𝐴𝑆5 +
𝛽14𝐷𝑂𝐷𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 + 𝛽15𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 + 𝜀        (4) 
 
I use two complementary measures for Risk, both calculated over [1, 60] and [1, 250] trading day 
intervals, where day 0 denotes the IPO date. One, I measure risk using the standard deviation of 
daily returns (e.g., Carter, Dark and Singh 1998). SDRET60 (SDRET250) is the standard 
deviation of daily raw returns for the 60 (250) trading days after the IPO date. Two, SDRESID60 
(SDRESID250) is the standard deviation of the residuals from the market model (Sharpe 1963) 
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estimated using the 60 (250) trading days after the IPO.14 I log-transform the standard deviations 
and estimate the market return using the daily return on the value-weighted CRSP. 
 AU9550 is my explanatory variable of interest. Because the audit opinions of larger 
auditors are more predictive of post-IPO outcomes and first-year returns (Weber and Willenborg 
2003), I include BIGN to control for auditor size. I control for the number of underwriters in the 
IPO syndicate (UNDERWRITERS) because underwriters can influence post-IPO prices through 
direct participation in the aftermarket (Ritter and Welch 2002). IPOLENGTH is included in the 
model because IPOs that take longer to complete have more time to engage in bookbuilding and 
price discovery (e.g., Aggarwal and Conroy 2000), which can impact the post-IPO performance. 
I include FLOAT as a control because the percentage of ownership retained in the company by 
pre-IPO owners can signal the credibility of company-provided information (Leland and Pyle 
1977). I control for the IPO date share turnover (TURNOVER), calculated as the number of 
shares traded relative to the total shares outstanding. INITIALRET equals the IPO date return, 
calculated as the difference between the price at the end of the IPO date and IPO offer price, 
scaled by the IPO offer price. Trading volume in the IPO aftermarket is higher when 
underpricing is greater (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack 1999; Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara 2000), 
and enhanced trading volume can lead to increased volatility. MKTVAL equals the number of 
shares outstanding on the IPO date times the IPO offer price and controls for company size, as 
small and large companies have different risk profiles that are reflected in return-based measures 
of risk (e.g., Cheung and Ng 1992). LITRISK and TECH are included for reasons similar to those 
provided in Section 3.2.2. Definitions for previously defined variables are still applicable.  
  
                                                        
14 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) similarly use the standard deviation of the residuals to measure idiosyncratic risk.  
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CHAPTER 4  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for AU 9550 disclosure by IPO year. Table 2, Panel 
A, displays the frequency of AU9550, the number of instances of ICDEF404_A, and mean 
OFFER_AMT by IPO year for the material weakness sample. Table 2, Panel B, displays the 
frequency of AU9550 by IPO year and the mean IPOPRICE and OFFER_AMT for the IPO offer 
price sample. Table 2, Panel C, presents the frequency of AU9550 and means for ROApost and 
OFFER_AMT by IPO year for the earnings forecast sample. Table 2, Panel D, shows the 
frequency of AU9550 and means for SDRET60 and OFFER_AMT by IPO year for the risk 
sample. All four panels show that AU 9550 disclosure is present in more than 50 percent of IPOs 
in each year after 2005. Gross IPO proceeds average at little more than $200 million overall. 
Panel A reveals that internal control deficiencies are more prevalent in IPOs completed in 2007 
and 2010. Panel B shows that mean IPO offer prices range from $13.11 in 2010 to $16.46 in 
2013. Panel C reveals that companies completing IPOs, on average, are not profitable in the near 
term after the IPO. The immediate post financial crisis years of 2009 and 2010 are notable 
exceptions, indicating that companies with stronger earnings prospects completed IPOs during 
this time. Finally, Panel D shows that the mean return volatility over the 60 trading days after the 
IPO ranged from 2.7 percent in 2005 and 2006 to 4.0 percent in 2008, which marked the height 
of the financial crisis. 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for my dependent and independent variables. Table 
3, Panel A, displays descriptive statistics for my dependent variables. The percentage of 
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observations reporting internal control deficiencies after the IPO (ICDEF404_A) is 5.1 percent.15 
IPOPRICE has a mean of $15.00 and exhibits great variation, with a standard deviation of $5.91. 
Companies have an average return on assets in the first year after their IPO of -0.5 percent, but 
more than half of the companies have a positive return on assets (ROApost). The standard 
deviations of returns (SDRET) and of the market model residuals (SDRESID) appear to be 
distributed similarly. SDRET and SDRESID are larger over the 250-trading day windows than 
over the 60-day windows, likely due to underwriters’ tapering of price support for the IPO in the 
aftermarket over time, as well as the expiration of lockup periods (typically 180 days) that 
increase liquidity.  
 Table 3, Panel B, displays descriptive statistics for my independent variables. The 
percentage of observations with AU 9550 disclosure (AU9550) is 58.6 percent, while 41.8 
percent of observations contain other non-going concern non-standard content (AU508OTHER) 
and 4.3 percent of observations contain going concern uncertainties (AU508GC). On average, at 
the time of the first Section 404(b) report, IPO companies are profitable (LOSS_A), liquid 
(CRATIO_A), not at risk of bankruptcy (ZSCORE_A), and carry relatively little inventory 
(INVENTORY_A). IPO companies appear to routinely engage high quality auditors (BIGN) and 
half of the IPOs use two or more lead underwriters (UNDERWRITERS). Sample IPO companies 
complete their IPO in an average of 130 days (IPO_LENGTH) and issue 12.6 million shares 
(SHARES_OFFER). The mean (median) IPO date turnover (TURNOVER) and returns 
(INITIALRET) are 20.7 percent (15.6 percent) and 13.3 percent (6.8 percent), respectively. 
Statistics for variables included in more than one multivariate model are presented only once for 
brevity.     
                                                        
15 Comparatively, of the 5,935 companies Doyle et al. (2007b) identify in the 2003 Compustat database, 779 
disclose material weaknesses between August 2002 and 2005, for a rate of 13.1 percent.  
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 Table 4 presents univariate statistics for the dependent variables in my multivariate 
analyses, by observations with and without AU9550. The table shows that IPO companies with 
AU9550 are significantly more likely to have post-IPO auditor-reported internal control 
deficiencies (p<0.05, two-tailed), indicating a univariate association between AU 9550 
disclosure and poor internal controls (ICDEF404_A). I also find a positive and significant 
association (p<0.05, two-tailed) between AU9550 and post-IPO intermediate-term return 
volatility (Log(SDRET250) and Log(SDRESID250)), suggesting that AU9550 is significantly 
associated with increased post-IPO risk. I do not find statistically significant univariate 
associations between AU9550 and IPO offer prices (IPOPRICE) or post-IPO earnings (ROApost). 
Overall, these results provide univariate support for hypotheses H1 and H4.   
 I analyze the correlations (not reported) between my independent variable and controls in 
my multivariate analyses. The pairwise correlations between AU9550 and each of BIGN, 
Log(AT), Log(OFFER_AMT), CHGAUDITOR, Log(AUDITFEES), and AS5_404 are statistically 
significant at p<0.05, but do not exceed 0.132 in absolute terms. I also perform collinearity 
diagnostics and find variance inflation factors for all variables are between one and five. 
Collectively, the results of these analyses suggest multicollinearity is not a significant concern. 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 Table 5 presents the logistic regression results for Model 1. Model 1 includes controls for 
factors from prior research found to be associated with the likelihood of auditor-reported 
material weaknesses in ICOFR. The discriminant ability of the model is excellent (ROC=0.81), 
following Lemeshow and Hosmer (1982). I use Model 1 to test H1, in which I predict that the 
inclusion of AU 9550 disclosure in the pre-IPO audit report is associated with an increased 
likelihood of post-IPO auditor-reported deficiencies in ICOFR in the first year the auditor 
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renders such an opinion. The coefficient for AU9550 is positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.05, one-tailed). The coefficient for AU9550 of 1.260 corresponds to an odds ratio of 4.604, 
which means that a company with AU 9550 disclosure is 4.6 times more likely to subsequently 
have a material weakness in ICOFR than a company without AU 9550 disclosure. These results 
provide support for my prediction in H1 that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with an increased 
likelihood of post-IPO auditor-reported control deficiencies and are consistent with the notion 
that AU 9550 disclosure reflects a poor internal control environment. 
 Table 6 presents my estimation of Model 2, which I use to test H2. In H2, I predict a 
negative association between AU 9550 disclosure and IPO offer prices. The coefficient for 
AU9550 is -0.317 and statistically significant (p<0.10, one-tailed), after controlling for other 
factors associated with IPO offer prices. The sign and magnitude of coefficient for AU9550 
suggests that the presence of AU 9550 disclosure is associated with an IPO offer price per share 
that is $0.32 lower. These results provide support for H2, indicating that AU 9550 disclosure is 
associated with lower IPO offer prices.   
 Table 7 presents the results for my test of H3. I estimate Model 3, which includes 
controls for factors that may be associated with future earnings, to test H3. In H3, I expect a 
negative association between AU 9550 disclosure and post-IPO earnings. Consistent with my 
prediction, the coefficient for AU9550 is negative and statistically significant (p<0.10, one-
tailed). The coefficient for AU9550 of -0.013 suggests that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with 
post-IPO return on assets that is, on average, 1.3 percent lower.  
 Table 8 presents the results for Model 4 and my test of H4. H4 predicts that the inclusion 
of AU 9550 disclosure in the pre-IPO audit report is associated with increased post-IPO risk, 
where risk is measured using the standard deviation of returns (SDRET[60, 250]) and the 
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standard deviation of unexplained returns (SDRESID[60, 250]) over the [60, 250] trading days 
after the IPO date. The coefficient for AU9550 is positive and not statistically significant in 
Columns 1 and 3, where the dependent variables are Log(SDRET60) and Log(SDRESID60), 
respectively, and positive and statistically significant in Columns 2 (p<0.05, one-tailed) and 4 
(p<0.10, one-tailed), where the dependent variables are Log(SDRET250) and Log(SDRESID250), 
respectively.16 These results indicate that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with increased post-
IPO risk beyond the first quarter after the IPO, providing support for H3b. 
 To summarize, I find results consistent with my hypotheses. AU 9550 disclosure is 
associated with a higher likelihood of auditor-reported material weaknesses in ICOFR in the first 
year the auditor opines on ICOFR. I also find that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with lower 
IPO offer prices. Finally, I find that AU 9550 disclosure is associated with lower post-IPO 
earnings and increased post-IPO risk. These results collectively suggest that voluntary AU 9550 
disclosure is informative, as it conveys information relevant to the assessment of information 
quality, company value, and future performance and risk.  
4.3 Selection Bias 
 Auditors’ decisions to add AU 9550 disclosure to the audit report do not arise randomly 
and pose a potential source of selection bias. I attempt to address the potential endogeneity in my 
setting using the Heckman (1979) procedure. I employ the Heckman procedure because it 
accommodates unobservable factors that may contribute to selection bias (Tucker 2010). This is 
important in my setting because there is limited data publicly available to proxy for the auditor’s 
private information that informs the pre-IPO decision.  
                                                        
16 The lack of statistically significant results over the 60 trading day window may be attributed to the presence of 
lock-up periods that restrict pre-IPO investor sales of shares, underwriter price stabilization activities, and limited 
opportunities for short selling, all of which can impact return volatility.  
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 In the first stage of the Heckman procedure, I use probit regression to estimate the 
following model for each of my four samples (material weakness, IPO offer price, earnings, and 
risk):  
𝐴𝑈9550 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈9550_𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀   (5) 
 
AU9550_PREV, my exclusion variable, equals one if a peer IPO company’s audit report contains 
AU 9550 disclosure, and zero otherwise. I identify peer IPO companies as those in the same 
industry that complete (i.e., do not withdraw) an IPO and are audited by a different auditor.17 
From the eligible peer IPO companies, I select the single peer IPO company that completed its 
IPO most recently prior to the filing date of the Company’s registration statement that contained 
the audit report. Model N Controls refer to the controls in Model N, where N=1, 2, 3, or 4. 
AU9550 is as previously defined. In untabulated results, the coefficient for AU9550_PREV is 
statistically significant (p<0.01, two-tailed) in all regressions.   
 From the estimation of Model 5 for each of my samples, I calculate the inverse Mills’ 
ratio and estimate the following second stage model: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑁 𝐷𝑒𝑝. 𝑉𝑎𝑟. = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈9550 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆 + 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 (6) 
 
Model N Dep. Var. refers to the dependent variable from Model N, where N=1, 2, 3, or 4. MILLS 
equals the inverse Mills’ ratio calculated from the first stage estimation.  
 To be a valid exclusion variable, AU9550_PREV should be correlated with AU9550, but 
uncorrelated with each MW, IPOPRICE, ROApost, and Risk. I expect AU9550 and AU9550_PREV 
to be correlated because the inclusion of AU 9550 disclosure by the auditor of a peer company 
                                                        
17 I consider peer IPO companies audited by a different auditor because audit firm and audit office experiences are 
incrementally significant predictors of financial reporting quality (Lennox and Li 2014). Identifying peer IPO 
companies with the same auditor may confound auditor experiences with client financial reporting or internal 
controls quality conveyed through AU 9550 disclosure. Additionally, a practically motivated reason for not 
considering IPOs by the same audit firm is that an audit firm is not likely to audit consecutively filed IPOs in the 
same industry. Nevertheless, untabulated analysis shows that my results are consistent when restricting my analysis 
of prior AU 9550 disclosure to peer IPO companies with the same auditor.    
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that recently completed its IPO may influence the auditor’s decision to add AU 9550 disclosure. 
On the one hand, auditors can use other auditors’ AU 9550 disclosure for recent IPOs as 
precedential leverage during audit report negotiations with the client. On the other hand, IPO 
companies that observe peers complete their offering with AU 9550 disclosure at lower offering 
prices are less willing to accept this non-standard disclosure. I do not expect AU9550_PREV to 
be correlated with the Model 6 dependent variables because AU 9550 disclosure reflects 
idiosyncratic financial information and internal controls quality. Therefore, the non-standard 
content of a peer IPO company’s audit report is not relevant to the assessment of the IPO 
company’s financial reporting or internal controls quality.   
 Table 9 presents the results of the estimation of Model 6. Column 1 shows a positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01, one-tailed) association between AU9550 and MW, providing 
continued support for H1. The coefficient for AU9550 is negative, but not statistically significant 
in Column 2.18 Column 3 reveals a negative and statistically significant (p<0.10, one-tailed) 
association between AU9550 and ROApost, providing further support for H3. Finally, the 
associations between AU9550 and each Log(SDRET250) and Log(SDRESID250) are positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.05, one-tailed), consistent with my prediction in H4. The 
associations between AU9550 and returns-based risk measures calculated over the 60 trading 
days after the IPO are not statistically significant. The coefficient for MILLS is statistically 
significant at p<0.05 (two-tailed) in Columns 3 (p<0.05, two-tailed) and 5 (p<0.10, two-tailed). 
The lack of statistical significance for MILLS in the other models suggests AU9550_PREV may 
be an imperfect exclusion variable in these models. Overall, the initial results in support of 
hypotheses H1, H3, and H4 continue to hold after controlling for selection bias.  
                                                        
18 In untabulated analyses, I confirm that the association between AU 9550 disclosure and two complementary 
measures of the IPO offer price (midpoint of the preliminary offer price range and IPO date closing price), discussed 
below, are robust to controls for selection bias. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 More prestigious auditors are associated with IPOs that are inherently less risky and have 
better long-term performance (Michaely and Shaw 1995). In my sample, roughly 90 percent of 
IPO companies engage a Big N auditor, providing little opportunity for companies to signal their 
quality based on auditor choice. However, to confirm that IPO companies not audited by Big N 
auditors are not driving my results, I re-estimate my multivariate models on the subset of IPO 
companies that engage a Big N auditor for their IPO. Table 10 presents the results of this 
analysis.19 AU9550 is statistically significant and in the predicted direction in Columns 1, 3, and 
4. The statistically insignificant coefficient for AU9550 indicates that the IPO companies with 
non-Big N auditors primarily drive the association between AU 9550 disclosure and IPO pricing 
presented in Table 6.     
 IPO companies provide information pertaining to internal controls in the risk factors 
section of the IPO registration statement (Basu, Krishnan, Lee, and Zhang 2013). As such, 
management-provided risk factor disclosures are a potential additional source of internal control-
related information available to financial statement users. To confirm that AU 9550 disclosure is 
informative, incremental to management-provided internal control risk factor disclosures, I 
search the risk factors section of the registration statements for ‘internal control’. I include an 
indicator variable that equals one if the company mentions internal controls, and zero otherwise, 
in each of my multivariate models. In untabulated analyses, I re-estimate Models 1 through 4 
after including this additional control and find that my results with respect to AU9550 are 
unchanged.  
 
                                                        
19 For brevity, I re-estimate Model 4 using only Log(SDRET250) as the dependent variable. 
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5.1 Material Weakness Additional Analyses  
 Management is required to assess the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls in 
accordance with Sections 404(a) and 302 after the IPO.20  I re-estimate Model 1 using two 
alternative dependent variables.21 One, ICDEF404_M equals one if the first Section 404(a) report 
(after the IPO) in which the company’s management opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR 
identifies internal control deficiencies, and zero otherwise. Two, ICDEF302 equals one if 
management’s first Section 302 report (after the IPO) identifies internal control deficiencies, and 
zero otherwise. The results of these re-estimations are presented in Table 11. AU9550 is not 
statistically significant in either re-estimation, indicating that AU9550 is not informative as to 
Section 404(a) or Section 302 internal control deficiencies. Prior research that examines internal 
controls under both Sections 302 and 404 also finds inconsistent results between the two sections 
of SOx (e.g., Beneish et al. 2008). Differing results can largely be attributed to management’s 
tendency to detect fewer, less severe, and less pervasive internal control deficiencies (Bedard and 
Graham 2011). The inconsistent results suggest that AU 9550 disclosure may indicate more 
pervasive internal controls problems, validating its associations with IPO offer pricing and post-
IPO earnings and risk.  
 There are 28 companies in my sample whose first Section 404(b) report identifies 
ineffective internal controls. This frequency suggests that the incidence of a control deficiency 
for IPO companies is a relatively rare event. In finite samples of rare events data, the method of 
computing probabilities of events in logistic analysis is and can lead to errors in the same 
                                                        
20 Whereas Section 302 primarily addresses controls over disclosures and does not require independent auditor 
attestation, Section 404 more broadly concerns internal controls over financial reporting and does require auditor 
attestation. Further, management is required to assess control effectiveness in accordance with Section 302 as early 
as the first quarter after the IPO, but has two years (minimum) before Section 404(a) attestation is required. 
21 Control variables are re-computed using data from the first fiscal year in which management provides its Section 
404(a) report. 
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direction as biases in the coefficients (King and Zeng 2001). To confirm that my results are 
robust to correcting for this potential bias, I re-estimate Model 1 using rare events logistic 
regression (King and Zeng 2001) and Firth logistic regression (Firth 1993; Heinze and Schemper 
2002). The untabulated results show that the coefficient for AU9550 remains positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.05, one-tailed) in both estimations.   
5.2 Offer Price Additional Analyses 
 Bartov et al. (2002) consider three complimentary values for the IPO offer price: the 
midpoint of the preliminary range for the offer price; the final offer price; and, the price at the 
end of the first trading day. The tabulated results for Model 2 are based on the final offer price as 
the dependent variable. Table 12 presents the results of the re-estimation of Model 2 using the 
two alternative measures for the IPO offer price. MIDPOINT equals the midpoint of the 
preliminary offer price range. FIRSTDAYPRC equals the closing share price on the IPO date.  
Table 12, Column 1, shows a negative and significant (p<0.01, one-tailed) coefficient for 
AU9550, indicating a negative association between AU 9550 disclosure and the midpoint of the 
preliminary offer price range. The coefficient for AU9550 remains negative and significant 
(p<0.01) in Column 2, where FIRSTDAYPRC is the dependent variable. These results are 
consistent with those presented in Table 6, providing additional evidence as to the link between 
AU 9550 disclosure and IPO pricing.  
 The Bartov et al. (2002) IPO offer pricing model that I adopt as a starting point for Model 
2 is a per share valuation model. Number of shares outstanding is an appealing scalar for IPO 
research that inherently includes numerous companies with negative earnings and book value of 
equity and little or no pre-IPO revenue – all of which are common scaling alternatives in 
accounting research. Moreover, in the IPO setting, where companies seek to raise a finite amount 
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of capital that is a function of the IPO offer price and number of shares issued, number of shares 
can be informative. The counterpoint suggests that shares outstanding is a relatively 
uninformative scalar in the sense that number of shares need not be indicative of size or 
resources available. Acknowledging this perspective, I re-estimate Model 2 using pre-IPO total 
assets and net property, plant, and equipment as scalars instead of shares outstanding. In 
untabulated results, while the coefficient for AU9550 remains negative in both re-estimations, it 
is not statistically significant. These inconsistent results underscore the sensitivity of empirical 
research to design trade-offs.   
 There is a vast literature in accounting and finance pertaining to IPO offer price revisions 
and IPO underpricing (see Ritter and Welch (2002) for a review). Greater ex ante uncertainty 
about an IPO’s value is positively associated with expected underpricing (Beatty and Ritter 
1986; Miller and Reilly 1987; Draho 2001). In the context of my study, AU 9550 disclosure that 
reflects poor internal controls is likely to increase investor uncertainty as to the quality of 
financial information, which may then manifest in greater underpricing (higher post IPO returns). 
Alternatively, post-IPO returns may be lower if poor internal controls adversely affect company 
operating performance that is then reflected in returns. I test for a significant association between 
AU 9550 disclosure and changes in the IPO offer price in both the pre- and after-markets. 
PRICREV measures pre-market changes in the IPO offer price and is calculated as the difference 
between IPOPRICE and MIDPOINT, scaled by MIDPOINT. I analyze changes in the after-
market price using various return windows beginning with the IPO date return (INIITIALRET) 
and cumulative returns over the 10, 60, 150, and 250 trading days after the IPO date (inclusive) 
(RET10, RET60, RET150, and RET250, respectively). I re-estimate Model 2, also controlling for 
TURNOVER, using these return-based dependent variables and tabulate the results in Table 13. 
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The coefficient for AU9550 is positive and statistically significant (p<0.10, two-tailed) in 
Column 1, indicating a positive association between AU 9550 disclosure and pre-IPO offer price 
revisions. I do not find a significant association between AU9550 and INITIALRET in Column 2. 
In Columns 3 through 6, the coefficients for AU9550 are negative and significant (p<0.10, two-
tailed). While asymmetric information theories are unlikely to be the primary determinant of 
underpricing (Ritter and Welch 2002), my results do suggest AU 9550 disclosure may reflect a 
poorer information environment or lower near-term prospects that manifest in lower returns for a 
year after the IPO date.  
5.3 Post-IPO Earnings Additional Analyses 
 As discussed in the development of H3, the internal control environment can have not 
only a real effect on earnings through its impact on company operations, but also a financial 
reporting effect through its impact on the quality of earnings. To better understand whether the 
association between AU 9550 disclosure and post-IPO earnings is attributable to real activities or 
financial reporting quality, I bifurcate earnings into its accrual and cash flow components. 
ACCRUALpost equals income statement-based accruals, calculated as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and operating cash flows, scaled by total assets for the first 
fiscal year ended after the IPO. CFOpost equals operating cash flow scaled by total assets for the 
first fiscal year ended after the IPO. I re-estimate Model 3 using these alternative dependent 
variables, as well as controlling for pre-IPO accruals and operating cash flow, respectively, and 
present the results in Table 14. Column 1 shows a negative and statistically significant (p<0.05, 
one-tailed) association between AU9550 and ACCRUALpost. Column 2 does not show a 
statistically significant association between AU9550 and OCFpost. These results suggest that the 
significant association between AU9550 and ROApost can largely be attributed to the relation 
 37 
between internal controls and financial reporting quality, rather than to the relation between 
internal controls and operating activities. This result is consistent with the notion that lower 
accruals quality stems from company-level controls that are more difficult to “audit around” 
(Doyle et al. 2007a). 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 This study investigates the informativeness of voluntary AU 9550 disclosure in audit 
reports included in IPO registration statements. Using a sample of initial public offerings 
completed on U.S. equity exchanges between 2005 and 2014, I find that voluntary non-standard 
audit report disclosure provided in accordance with AU Section 9550 is associated with a higher 
likelihood of post-IPO auditor-reported internal control deficiencies, lower IPO offer prices, 
lower post-IPO earnings, and higher post-IPO risk. My post-IPO material weakness, earnings, 
and risk results are robust to addressing the endogenous nature of the auditor’s decision to add 
AU 9550 disclosure to the audit report. Overall, my results indicate that voluntary auditor-
provided internal controls-related disclosures are informative in the IPO setting.  
 My research makes three primary contributions to the accounting literature. One, I 
contribute to the voluntary disclosure literature by documenting that voluntary, internal controls-
related auditor disclosures are informative as to financial information quality and company risk 
in the post-SOx environment. This finding should be of interest to IPO investors and to 
regulators reforming the current auditor’s reporting model. Two, I contribute to the internal 
controls literature by identifying information that is informative of future auditor-reported 
deficiencies in internal controls over financial reporting. This result should be of interest to 
legislators that recently passed legislation to further delay the public communication of internal 
control deficiencies that may be known at the IPO date, for qualifying IPO companies. Finally, I 
contribute to the audit report literature by studying a previously unexamined type of auditor 
disclosure and providing evidence as to the informativeness of audit report content strictly in the 
post-SOx regulatory environment. 
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 I conduct my research in the IPO setting where companies are not required, nor are they 
expected, to have an external auditor opine on the effectiveness of their internal controls. As 
well, the information environment for IPO companies is not as complex as that for existing 
public companies. Future research may examine whether AU 9550 disclosure is differentially 
informative for existing public companies. Subsequent studies may also consider how non-equity 
investor financial statement users and information intermediaries, such as analysts, appear to use 
these non-standard audit report disclosures.  
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Completed IPOs downloaded from NASDAQ 2005 - 2014 
 
1,669  
Less IPOs with an offer price of $5 per share or less and is non-missing 
 
(109) 
Less IPOs with pre-IPO assets of $1,000,000 or less or missing 
 
(328) 
Less IPOs for which the audit report was not available in the registration statement 
 
(125) 
Less IPOs with pre-IPO Section 404(b) opinions  (16) 
Less non-operating entity IPOs 
 
(8) 
Observations eligible for inclusion in the multivariate analysis 
 
1,083  
Less IPOs without post-IPO Section 404(b) data in AuditAnalytics  
 
(339) 
Less IPOs with Section 404(b) data in AuditAnalytics more than 27 months after 
the IPO  (40) 
Less IPOs missing data for control variables 
 
(155) 
Total sample for the material weakness model 
 
549  
   
Less IPOs missing data for control variables 
 
(38) 
Total sample for the offer price model 
 
1,045  
   Less IPOs with ROApre of less than -100 percent  (58) 
Less IPOs without Compustat data for a fiscal year ending with a year after the 
IPO date  (26) 
Less IPOs missing data for control variables 
 
(133) 
Total sample for the earnings model 
 
866  
   Less IPOs missing data in CRSP  (234) 
Less IPOs missing data for control variables 
 
(15) 
Total sample for the risk model 
 
834 
 
Table 1 details my sample selection procedure. 
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TABLE 2 
 
NON-STANDARD AUDIT REPORT DISCLOSURE BY IPO YEAR 
 
Panel A: AU9550 by year for the material weakness sample 
  
AU9550 ICDEF404_A OFFER_AMT 
IPO Year N n=1 % n=1 Mean ($mil) 
2005 95 43 45.26% 3 192.91 
2006 102 65 63.73% 4 227.75 
2007 106 71 66.98% 7 201.48 
2008 20 12 60.00% 1 372.86 
2009 34 19 55.88% 2 334.65 
2010 80 45 56.25% 7 168.58 
2011 71 42 59.15% 3 228.14 
2012 38 26 68.42% 1 276.78 
2013 3 1 33.33% 0 682.35 
Total 549 324 59.02% 28 225.86 
 
Panel B: AU9550 by year for the IPO offer price sample 
  
AU9550 IPOPRICE OFFER_AMT 
IPO Year N n=1 % Mean Mean ($mil) 
2005 159 64 40.25% 14.68 160.98 
2006 162 99 61.11% 15.01 200.89 
2007 174 114 65.52% 14.86 220.13 
2008 29 16 55.17% 13.66 255.84 
2009 50 31 62.00% 14.00 314.71 
2010 116 69 59.48% 13.11 153.64 
2011 92 54 58.70% 15.59 230.80 
2012 96 61 63.54% 15.85 189.01 
2013 167 104 62.28% 16.46 230.03 
Total 1,045 612 58.56% 15.00 205.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: AU9550 by year for the earnings sample 
  
AU9550 ROApost OFFER_AMT 
IPO Year N n=1 % Mean Mean ($mil) 
2005 128 58 45.31% 0.001 166.92 
2006 128 83 64.84% 0.011 207.38 
2007 140 94 67.14% -0.014 190.52 
2008 26 16 61.54% -0.007 300.19 
2009 46 28 60.87% 0.064 284.22 
2010 99 58 58.59% 0.026 156.70 
2011 80 47 58.75% -0.007 218.21 
2012 84 54 64.29% -0.009 190.44 
2013 134 79 58.96% -0.056 263.82 
2014 1 1 100.00% -0.056 310.00 
Total 866 518 59.82% -0.005 207.96 
 
Panel D: AU9550 by year for the risk sample 
  
AU9550 SDRET60 OFFER_AMT 
IPO Year N n=1 % Mean Mean ($mil) 
2005 134 55 41.04% 0.027 166.12 
2006 137 84 61.31% 0.027 203.25 
2007 130 85 65.38% 0.033 192.02 
2008 23 11 47.83% 0.040 295.32 
2009 41 25 60.98% 0.029 294.75 
2010 81 46 56.79% 0.030 162.10 
2011 71 42 59.15% 0.036 252.15 
2012 78 50 64.10% 0.030 180.02 
2013 138 87 63.04% 0.031 234.19 
2014 1 1 100.00% 0.033 310.00 
Total 834 486 58.27% 0.030 205.81 
 
Table 2 describes my dependent variables and independent variable of interest by IPO year. 
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TABLE 3 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Variable N Mean  Std. Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
ICDEF404_A 549 0.051 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
IPOPRICE 1,045 15.000 5.907 7.000 11.000 14.000 18.000 24.500 
ROApost 866 -0.005 0.174 -0.371 -0.036 0.028 0.084 0.203 
SDRET60 834 0.030 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.029 0.037 0.055 
SDRET250 834 0.033 0.013 0.016 0.024 0.031 0.040 0.057 
SDRESID60 834 0.029 0.013 0.013 0.020 0.028 0.036 0.052 
SDRESID250 834 0.031 0.013 0.015 0.022 0.029 0.039 0.054 
 
Panel B: Independent and control variables 
Variable N Mean  Std. Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
AU9550 1,045 0.586 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AU508OTHER 1,045 0.418 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AU508GC 1,045 0.043 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSS_A 549 0.288 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CRATIO_A 549 3.351 3.257 0.692 1.463 2.382 3.943 10.101 
INVENTORY_A 549 0.060 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.087 0.266 
ZSCORE_A 549 -3.171 1.741 -5.124 -4.495 -3.608 -2.209 -0.264 
MKTVAL404_A ($mil) 549 1,344.427 2,179.497 97.891 288.128 621.055 1,478.609 4,824.631 
SQEMPLOYEES_A 549 105.361 817.991 0.000 0.069 0.679 7.290 227.226 
SEGMENTS_A 549 2.056 2.127 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 7.000 
BIGN404 549 0.971 0.168 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CHGAUDITOR_A 549 0.036 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NAFRATIO_A 549 0.146 0.140 0.000 0.020 0.118 0.235 0.410 
AUDITFEES_A ($mil) 549 1.358 1.373 0.340 0.633 0.974 1.501 3.509 
(continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
Variable N Mean  Std. Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
AS5_404_A 549 0.814 0.389 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BIGN 1,045 0.902 0.297 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UNDERWRITERS 1,045 2.040 0.881 1.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 4.000 
IPO_LENGTH 1,045 129.658 122.516 19.000 50.000 98.000 152.000 371.000 
SHARES_OFFER (000s) 1,045 12,606.827 13,355.781 2,900.000 5,600.000 8,500.000 13,430.000 35,294.118 
POSEPS 1,045 0.712 1.555 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.701 3.206 
NEGEPS 1,045 -0.353 0.741 -1.849 -0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 
POSBV 1.045 4.021 9.287 0.000 0.000 0.618 4.014 18.155 
NEGBV 1.045 -1.238 2.481 -6.424 -1.384 0.000 0.00 0.000 
FLOAT 1.045 0.389 0.277 0.083 0.208 0.289 0.465 1.000 
RDPS 1.045 0.275 0.531 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.376 1.273 
NASD_ADJ 1.045 2,529.148 427.775 2,042.143 2,228.739 2,448.752 2,696.565 3,487.719 
LITRISK 1.045 0.416 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
TECH 1.045 0.237 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AS5 1,045 0.533 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DODDFRANK 1,045 0.281 0.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
JOBS 1,045 0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROApre 866 -0.030 0.261 -0.584 -0.091 0.023 0.100 0.303 
NWCpre 866 0.172 0.305 -0.210 -0.002 0.128 0.336 0.725 
LEVERAGEpre 866 0.310 0.349 0.000 0.017 0.219 0.488 0.902 
ATpre ($mil) 866 694.795 1,823.865 18.59 55.231 138.772 509.341 3,166.870 
OFFER_AMT ($mil) 866 207.958 257.748 35.000 75.012 120.471 232.875 660.000 
TURNOVER 834 0.207 0.192 0.025 0.096 0.156 0.247 0.607 
INITIALRET 834 0.133 0.219 -0.095 0.000 0.068 0.221 0.594 
MKTVAL ($mil) 834 760.539 1,249.487 75.847 222.459 391.905 794.738 2,487.674 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for dependent, independent, and control variables.
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TABLE 4 
 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
 
AU9550 = 1 AU9550 = 0 
  Variables N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff. Test Statistic 
ICDEF404_A 549 0.068 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.051 2.165** 
IPOPRICE 1,045 14.827 14.000 15.243 14.500 -0.0416 -1.122 
ROApost 866 -0.008 0.023 0.001 0.033 -0.009 -0.761 
Log(SDRET60) 834 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.001 1.579 
Log(SDRET250) 834 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.002 2.340** 
Log(SDRESID60) 834 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.001 1.479 
Log(SDRESID250) 834 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.002 2.404** 
 
Table 4 presents univariate statistics by AU9550 for dependent variables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10 
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TABLE 5 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND POST-IPO AUDITOR-
REPORTED MATERIAL WEAKNESSES 
 
 Expected Sign ICDEF404_A 
   
AU9550 + (H1) 1.260** 
  (2.402) 
AU508OTHER ? -0.189 
  (-0.431) 
AU508GC + 0.668 
  (0.560) 
LOSS_A + 0.453 
  (0.897) 
CRATIO_A - -0.032 
  (-0.361) 
INVENTORY_A + 0.365 
  (0.165) 
ZSCORE_A - -0.119 
  (-0.860) 
Log(MKTVAL404_A) - -1.057*** 
  (-4.066) 
SQEMPLOYEES_A + -0.000 
  (-0.411) 
Log(SEGMENTS_A) + -0.381 
  (-1.005) 
BIGN404 ? -2.591*** 
  (-2.995) 
CHGAUDITOR_A + 1.198 
  (1.296) 
NAFRATIO_A - 0.498 
  (0.305) 
Log(AUDITFEES_A) ? 1.685*** 
  (3.940) 
LITRISK + -0.316 
  (-0.693) 
AS5_404_A ? -0.150 
  (-0.247) 
Constant  -18.209*** 
  (-3.555) 
   
Observations  549 
Pseudo R-square  0.182 
ROC  0.81 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of Model 1, used to test H1. ICDEF404_A equals one if the first 
Section 404(b) report after the IPO identifies internal control deficiencies, and zero otherwise. AU9550 equals one if 
the audit report included in the IPO registration statement contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU 
Section 9550, and zero otherwise. Refer to Appendix B for all other variable definitions. 
z statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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TABLE 6 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND IPO PRICING 
 
 Expected Sign IPOPRICE 
   
AU9550 - (H2) -0.317* 
  (-1.517) 
AU508OTHER ? -0.454 
  (-1.463) 
AU508GC - -2.100 
  (-1.444) 
BIGN + 0.013 
  (0.018) 
Log(UNDERWRITERS) + 2.127** 
  (2.764) 
Log(IPO_LENGTH) ? -0.202 
  (-1.004) 
Log(SHARES_OFFER) ? 1.537*** 
  (3.807) 
POSEPS + 0.509*** 
  (5.193) 
NEGEPS + -0.413 
  (-0.606) 
POSBV + 0.081** 
  (2.557) 
NEGBV + -0.043 
  (-0.383) 
FLOAT - -1.527 
  (-1.702) 
RDPS ? -0.208 
  (-0.276) 
NASD_ADJ + 0.000 
  (0.093) 
LITRISK - -0.897 
  (-1.164) 
TECH ? -1.373* 
  (-2.020) 
AS5 ? -1.809** 
  (-2.639) 
DODDFRANK ? 1.730** 
  (2.343) 
JOBS ? 0.480 
  (0.636) 
Constant  -9.896 
  (-1.222) 
   
Observations  1,045 
R-squared  0.197 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of Model 2, used to test H2. IPOPRICE equals the final IPO price per 
share. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration statement contains voluntary disclosure 
in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero otherwise. Refer to Appendix B for all other variable definitions. 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered by industry based on the 
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) industry classification. 
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TABLE 7 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND POST-IPO EARNINGS 
 
 Expected Sign ROApost 
   
AU9550 - (H3a) -0.013* 
  (-2.062) 
AU508OTHER ? 0.015 
  (1.592) 
AU508GC - -0.232** 
  (-2.298) 
ROApre + 0.440*** 
  (11.090) 
NWCpre + -0.044* 
  (-1.779) 
LEVERAGEpre + -0.019 
  (-0.981) 
Log(ATpre) ? -0.008** 
  (-2.364) 
Log(OFFER_AMT) + 0.030*** 
  (3.071) 
Year Indicators  Included 
Constant  -0.530** 
  (-2.928) 
   
Observations  866 
R-squared  0.553 
 
Table 7 presents the results for the estimation of Model 3, used to test H3a. ROApost equals return on assets for the 
first fiscal year ended after the IPO. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration statement 
contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero otherwise. Refer to Appendix B for all 
other variable definitions. 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered by industry based on the 
Frankel et al. (2002) industry classification. 
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TABLE 8 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND POST-IPO RISK 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expected Sign Log(SDRET60) Log(SDRET250) Log(SDRESID60) Log(SDRESID250) 
      
AU9550 + (H3b) 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.001* 
  (1.063) (2.197) (0.819) (1.884) 
AU508OTHER ? -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
  (-0.487) (1.089) (-0.257) (0.761) 
AU508GC + 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (3.071) (2.750) (3.130) (3.138) 
BIGN ? 0.003** 0.000 0.002** 0.000 
  (2.482) (0.179) (2.216) (0.220) 
Log(UNDERWRITERS) - -0.002* -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 
  (-1.880) (-1.049) (-1.876) (-0.762) 
Log(IPO_LENGTH) - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.942) (0.596) (0.808) (0.341) 
FLOAT - -0.017*** -0.013** -0.017*** -0.014** 
  (-5.000) (-2.429) (-5.017) (-2.879) 
TURNOVER + 0.009** 0.005 0.008** 0.005 
  (2.539) (1.223) (2.384) (1.254) 
INITIALRET + 0.009*** 0.004** 0.009*** 0.003** 
  (4.757) (2.377) (4.712) (3.056) 
Log(MKTVAL) - -0.002*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-3.724) (-2.666) (-4.187) (-3.302) 
LITRISK + 0.006*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.006** 
  (3.783) (2.336) (3.602) (2.962) 
TECH + 0.003** 0.002 0.002* 0.002 
  (2.188) (0.976) (1.969) (1.405) 
AS5 ? 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 
  (4.201) (4.120) (3.309) (1.615) 
DODDFRANK ? 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.480) (-1.750) (0.324) (-0.714) 
JOBS ? -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002*** -0.001 
  (-6.146) (-1.263) (-3.435) (-0.884) 
Constant  0.076*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.094*** 
  (4.582) (3.518) (4.951) (4.135) 
      
Observations  834 834 834 834 
R-squared  0.267 0.192 0.276 0.220 
 
Table 8 presents the results for the estimation of Model 4, used to test H3a. The dependent variables for Columns 1 
and 2 are Log(SDRET60) and Log(SDRET250), respectively. The dependent variables for Columns 3 and 4 are 
Log(SDRESID60) and Log(SDRESID250), respectively. SDRET60(250) equals the standard deviation of daily 
returns over the 60 (250) trading days after the IPO date. SDRESID60(250) equals the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the market model estimated over the 60 (250) trading days after the IPO date. AU9550 equals one if 
the audit report included in the IPO registration statement contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU 
Section 9550, and zero otherwise. Refer to Appendix B for all other variable definitions. 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered by industry based on the 
Frankel et al. (2002) industry classification. 
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TABLE 9 
 
CONTROLLING FOR SELECTION BIAS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ICDEF404_A IPOPRICE ROApost Log(SDRET60) Log(SDRET250) Log(SDRESID60) Log(SDRESID250) 
        
AU9550 1.276*** -0.284 -0.011* 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.001** 
 (2.424) (-1.209) (-1.733) (1.009) (2.256) (0.777) (1.885) 
MILLS 1.658 1.563 0.081** -0.002 0.010* -0.003 0.008 
 (0.635) (0.762) (2.354) (-0.464) (1.881) (-0.757) (1.406) 
        
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -16.893*** -11.465 -0.462** 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.097*** 
 (-3.122) (-1.376) (-2.717) (4.742) (3.790) (5.071) (4.264) 
        
Observations 548 1,042 862 831 831 831 831 
(Pseudo) R-square 0.184 0.198 0.555 0.268 0.195 0.277 0.223 
ROC 0.82 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 9 presents the results for the estimation of Model 6. ICDEF404_A equals one if the first Section 404(b) report after the IPO identifies internal control 
deficiencies, and zero otherwise. IPOPRICE equals the price per share at which the IPO company’s shares are initially offered for sale to the public. ROApost 
equals return on assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO. SDRET[60, 250] equals the standard deviation of daily returns over the [60, 250] trading days 
after the IPO date. SDRESID[60, 250] equals the standard deviation of the residuals from the market model estimated over the [60, 250] trading days after the 
IPO date. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration statement contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, 
and zero otherwise.  
z (t) statistics in parentheses for logistic (ordinary least squares) regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in Columns 2 through 7 are 
clustered by industry based on the Frankel et al. (2002) industry classification. 
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TABLE 10 
 
BIG N AUDITOR SUB-SAMPLES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ICDEF404_A IPOPRICE ROApost Log(SDRET250) 
     
AU9550 1.183** -0.282 -0.013* 0.001* 
 (2.243) (-1.140) (-1.766) (1.446) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Constant -24.152*** -13.675* -0.554** 0.092*** 
 (-4.162) (-1.866) (-2.561) (4.252) 
     
Observations 533 943 786 744 
(Pseudo) R-square 0.163 0.198 0.562 0.202 
ROC 0.81 N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 10 presents the results for the estimation of Models 1, 2, 3, and 4. ICDEF404_A equals one if the first Section 
404(b) report after the IPO identifies internal control deficiencies, and zero otherwise. IPOPRICE equals the price 
per share at which the IPO company’s shares are initially offered for sale to the public. ROApost equals return on 
assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO. SDRET250 equals the standard deviation of daily returns over the 
250 trading days after the IPO date. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration statement 
contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero otherwise. 
z (t) statistics in parentheses for logistic (ordinary least squares) regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Standard errors in Columns 2 through 4 are clustered by industry based on the Frankel et al. (2002) industry 
classification. 
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TABLE 11 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND POST-IPO SECTION 404(a) 
AND 302 INTERNAL CONTROL DEFICIENCIES 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ICDEF404_M ICDEF302 
   
AU9550 -0.069 -0.418 
 (-0.220) (-1.593) 
AU508OTHER -0.033 -0.484* 
 (-0.106) (-1.806) 
AU508GC 0.009 -0.139 
 (0.010) (-0.198) 
LOSS_M 0.131 0.080 
 (0.361) (0.258) 
CRATIO_M 0.037 0.032 
 (1.208) (1.037) 
INVENTORY_M 1.022 -1.275 
 (0.741) (-0.929) 
ZSCORE_M -0.190* -0.055 
 (-1.890) (-0.627) 
Log(MKTVAL404_M) -0.709*** -0.497*** 
 (-4.255) (-3.679) 
SQEMPLOYEES_M -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.786) (-1.270) 
Log(SEGMENTS_M) -0.094 -0.073 
 (-0.379) (-0.336) 
BIGN404 -1.189*** -0.539 
 (-3.104) (-1.510) 
CHGAUDITOR_M 0.407 0.568 
 (0.502) (0.819) 
NAFRATIO_M 3.848*** 0.578 
 (3.933) (0.624) 
Log(AUDITFEES_M) 0.913*** 1.323*** 
 (3.244) (5.375) 
LITRISK -0.011 -0.245 
 (-0.037) (-0.884) 
AS5_404_M -0.294 0.325 
 (-0.667) (0.869) 
Constant -10.902*** -16.729*** 
 (-3.199) (-5.510) 
   
Observations 678 678 
Pseudo R-square 0.123 0.095 
ROC 0.75 0.72 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the re-estimation of Model 1 using dependent variables based on management’s 
assessment of internal control effectiveness. ICDEF404_M equals one if the first Section 404(a) report after the IPO 
identifies internal control deficiencies, and zero otherwise. ICDEF302 equals one if the first Section 302 report after 
the IPO identifies internal control deficiencies, and zero otherwise. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in 
the IPO registration statement contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero 
otherwise. Refer to Appendix B for all other variable definitions. 
z statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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TABLE 12 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND ALTERNATIVE IPO 
PRICING MEASURES 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MIDPOINT FIRSTDAYPRC 
   
AU9550 -0.547*** -0.828*** 
 (-3.255) (-3.219) 
Controls Included Included 
Constant -7.056 -16.070 
 (-1.000) (-1.549) 
   
Observations 878 821 
R-squared 0.245 0.146 
 
Table 12 presents the results of the re-estimation of Model 2 using two complementary measures for the IPO offer 
price. MIDPOINT equals the midpoint of the preliminary offer price range. FIRSTDAYPRC equals the closing share 
price on the IPO date. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration statement contains 
voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero otherwise. Refer to Appendix B for all other 
variable definitions. 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered by industry based on the 
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) industry classification. 
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TABLE 13 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND CHANGES IN IPO PRICING 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRICEREV INITIALRET RET10 RET60 RET150 RET250 
       
AU9550 0.002* -0.012 -0.018* -0.050** -0.053* -0.054* 
 (1.884) (-1.521) (-1.792) (-2.888) (-1.787) (-2.149) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.158*** -0.143 -0.138 -0.038 0.151 1.057 
 (6.855) (-1.263) (-0.885) (-0.111) (0.295) (1.745) 
       
Observations 878 821 821 821 821 821 
R-squared 0.199 0.234 0.179 0.145 0.106 0.119 
 
Table 13 presents the results of an analysis of the association between AU 9550 and changes in the IPO prices in the pre- and after-market. PRICEREV equals the 
difference between the IPO offer price and midpoint of the preliminary offer price range, scaled by the midpoint of the preliminary offer price range. 
INITIALRET is the IPO date return, calculated as the difference between the closing price and IPO offer price, scaled by the IPO offer price. RET[10, 60, 150, 
250] equals the cumulative return over the 10, 60, 150, and 250 trading days after the IPO date (inclusive). AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the 
IPO registration statement contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero otherwise. The controls included are from Model 2, plus 
TURNOVER. Refer to Appendix B for all other variable definitions. 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered by industry based on the Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) industry 
classification. 
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TABLE 14 
 
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AU 9550 DISCLOSURE AND COMPONENTS OF POST-
IPO EARNINGS 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ACCRUALpost OCFpost 
   
AU9550 -0.013** 0.003 
 (-2.068) (0.420) 
AU508OTHER 0.004 0.005 
 (0.432) (0.611) 
AU508GC -0.078 -0.158*** 
 (-0.997) (-5.349) 
ACCRUALpre 0.201***  
 (5.381)  
OCFpre  0.415*** 
  (12.022) 
NWCpre 0.047*** -0.078* 
 (4.247) (-1.962) 
LEVERAGEpre -0.011 -0.012 
 (-0.677) (-0.584) 
Log(ATpre) -0.007** 0.006 
 (-2.225) (1.315) 
Log(OFFER_AMT) 0.004 0.019** 
 (0.626) (2.615) 
Year Indicators Included Included 
Constant -0.110 -0.328** 
 (-0.901) (-2.666) 
   
Observations 865 865 
R-squared 0.155 0.526 
 
Table 14 presents the results for the estimation of Model 3, used to test H3a. ACCRUALpost equals income statement-
based accruals, calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows, 
scaled by total assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO. OCFpost equals operating cash flows scaled by total 
assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO. AU9550 equals one if the audit report included in the IPO 
registration statement contains voluntary disclosure in accordance with AU Section 9550, and zero otherwise. Refer 
to Appendix B for all other variable definitions. 
t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered by industry based on the 
Frankel et al. (2002) industry classification. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXAMPLES OF AU 9550 DISCLOSURE 
 
“We were not engaged to perform an audit of the Company’s internal control over financial 
reporting. Our audits included consideration of internal control over financial reporting as a basis 
for designing audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose 
of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial 
reporting. Accordingly, we express no such opinion.”     
          ~ Facebook, Inc. 
 
“The Company is not required to have, nor were we engaged to perform, an audit of its internal 
control over financial reporting. Our audits included consideration of internal control over 
financial reporting as a basis for designing audit procedures that are appropriate in the 
circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the 
Company’s internal control over financial reporting. Accordingly, we express no such opinion.”  
          ~ Shoretel, Inc. 
 
“The Company is not required to have, nor were we engaged to perform an audit of its internal 
control over financial reporting. Our audits included consideration of internal control over 
financial reporting as a basis for designing audit procedures that are appropriate in the 
circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the 
Company’s internal control over financial reporting. Accordingly, we express no such opinion.”  
          ~ Petroalgae Inc.  
 
“We were not engaged to perform an audit of the Company’s internal control over financial 
reporting. Our audits included consideration of internal control over financial reporting as a basis 
for designing audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose 
of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial 
reporting. Accordingly, we express no such opinion.”    
        ~ Ambit Biosciences Corporation 
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APPENDIX B 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Dependent Variables 
ICDEF404_[A, M] Equals one if the first Section 404[(b), (a)] report (after the IPO) in 
which the company’s [auditor, management] opines on the 
effectiveness of ICOFR identifies internal control deficiencies, and 
zero otherwise (Source: AuditAnalytics) 
 
IPOPRICE IPO offer price, which is the price per share at which the company 
originally offers its common equity shares for sale to the public 
(Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
ROApost Return on assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO, 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets (Source: Compustat) 
 
SDRET60(250) Standard deviation of daily raw returns calculated over the 60 (250) 
trading days after the IPO date (Source: CRSP) 
 
SDRESID60(250) Standard deviation of the residuals from the market model, 
calculated using the 60 (250) trading days after the IPO date 
(Source: CRSP) 
 
ICDEF302 Equals one if management’s first Section 302 report (after the IPO) 
identifies internal control deficiencies, and zero otherwise (Source: 
AuditAnalytics) 
 
MIDPOINT The midpoint of the preliminary offer price range (Source: Yahoo! 
Finance) 
 
FIRSTDAYPRC The closing share price on the IPO date (Source: CRSP) 
 
PRICEREV IPO offer price revision, calculated as the difference between 
IPOPRICE and MIDPOINT, scaled by MIDPOINT  
 
INITIALRET IPO date return, calculated as the difference between 
FIRSTDAYPRCE and IPOPRICE, scaled by IPOPRICE 
 
RET[10, 30, 150, 250] Cumulative return over the [10, 30, 150, 250] trading days after the 
IPO date (inclusive) (Source: CRSP)  
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
 
ACCRUALpost Income statement accruals, calculated as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and operating cash flows, scaled 
by total assets for the first fiscal year ended after the IPO (Source: 
Compustat) 
 
OCFpost Operating cash flows divided by total assets for the first fiscal year 
ended after the IPO (Source: Compustat) 
 
 
Independent Variable 
AU9550 Equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration 
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section 9550 
that states the auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion on the 
effectiveness of ICOFR, and zero otherwise 
 
 
Control Variables 
AU508OTHER Equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration 
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section 508 
that does not express substantial doubt about the company’s ability 
to continue as a going concern, and zero otherwise 
 
AU508GC Equals one if the audit report included in the IPO registration 
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section 508 
that expresses substantial doubt about the company’s ability to 
continue as a going concern, and zero otherwise 
 
LOSS_[A, M] Equals one if the company reports a net loss in the first fiscal year 
ended in which the company’s [auditor, management] opines on the 
effectiveness of ICOFR, and zero otherwise (Source: Compustat) 
  
CRATIO_[A, M] Current ratio, calculated as total current assets divided total current 
liabilities as of the first fiscal year end in which the company’s 
[auditor, management] opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR 
(Source: Compustat) 
 
INVENTORY_[A, M] Total inventory as of the first fiscal year end in which the company’s 
[auditor, management] opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR, scaled 
by total assets for the same period end (Source: Compustat) 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
 
ZSCORE_[A, M] Zmijewski (1984) financial distress measure, calculated as of and for 
the fiscal year ended in which the company’s [auditor, management] 
opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR (Source: Compustat) 
 
MKTVAL404_[A, M] Market value of equity as of the fiscal year end in which the 
company’s [auditor, management] opines on the effectiveness of 
ICOFR, calculated as the fiscal year end price per share times the 
total common shares outstanding (Source: Compustat) 
 
SQEMPLOYEES_[A, M] The square of the number of employees as of fiscal year end for the 
year in which the company’s [auditor, management] opines on the 
effectiveness of ICOFR (Source: Compustat) 
 
SEGMENTS_[A, M] The number of geographic segments in the fiscal year the company’s 
[auditor, management] first opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR 
(Source: Compustat) 
 
BIGN404 Equals one if the company’s auditor that first opines on the 
effectiveness of ICOFR is Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and zero otherwise (Source: 
AuditAnalytics) 
 
CHGAUDITOR_[A, M] Equals one if the company changes auditors between the IPO date 
and the fiscal year end of the first year in which the company’s 
[auditor, management] opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR, and 
zero otherwise (Source: AuditAnalytics) 
  
NAFRATIO_[A, M] The ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees for the first fiscal year 
in which the company’s [auditor, management] opines on the 
effectiveness of ICOFR (Source: AuditAnalytics) 
 
AUDITFEES_[A, M] Total audit fees for the first fiscal year in which the company’s 
[auditor, management] opines on the effectiveness of ICOFR 
(Source: AuditAnalytics) 
 
AS5_404_[A, M] Equals one if the first audit report that includes an opinion from [the 
auditor, management] on the effectiveness of ICOFR is for a period 
ended on or after November 15, 2007, and zero otherwise 
 
BIGN Equals one if the company’s auditor at the time of the IPO is 
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and 
zero otherwise (Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
(continued on the next page) 
 68 
APPENDIX B (continued) 
 
UNDERWRITERS Number of non-lead underwriters involved in the IPO (Source: 
www.nasdaq.com) 
 
IPO_LENGTH Number of days between the original registration statement filing 
and the IPO date (Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
SHARES_OFFER Number of shares issued in the IPO (Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
POSEPS Equals earnings per share, calculated as income before continuing 
operations in the last year prior to the IPO (Source: Compustat) 
divided by post-IPO shares outstanding (Source: www.nasdaq.com), 
if earnings per share is positive, and zero otherwise 
 
NEGEPS Equals earnings per share, calculated as income before continuing 
operations in the last year prior to the IPO (Source: Compustat) 
divided by post-IPO shares outstanding (Source: www.nasdaq.com), 
if earnings per share is not positive, and zero otherwise 
 
POSBV Equals book value of equity per share, calculated as book value of 
equity in the last year prior to the IPO (Source: Compustat) divided 
by post-IPO shares outstanding (Source: www.nasdaq.com), if book 
value per share is positive, and zero otherwise 
 
NEGBV Equals book value of equity per share, calculated as book value of 
equity in the last year prior to the IPO (Source: Compustat) divided 
by post-IPO shares outstanding (Source: www.nasdaq.com), if book 
value per share is not positive, and zero otherwise 
 
FLOAT Number of shares issued in the IPO divided by total shares 
outstanding after the IPO (Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
RDPS Research and development expense per share, calculated as research 
and development expense in the last year prior to the IPO (Source: 
Compustat) divided by post-IPO shares outstanding (Source: 
www.nasdaq.com) 
 
NASD_ADJ Inflation-adjusted level of the NASDAQ on the IPO date, calculated 
as the level of the NASDAQ adjusted for inflation using the level of 
the Consumer Price Index at the end of the IPO month (Source: 
CRSP) 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
 
TECH Equals one if the company operates in a technology industry, where 
technology industries are identified based on four-digit SIC 
following Loughran and Ritter (2004), and zero otherwise 
 
LITRISK Equals one if the company operates in a high litigation risk industry, 
where high litigation risk industries are identified based on four-digit 
SIC following Venkataraman et al. (2008), and zero otherwise 
 
AS5 Equals one if audit report included in the registration statement is for 
a period ended on or after November 15, 2007, and zero otherwise 
 
DODDFRANK Equals one if the company’s IPO date is on or after July 21, 2011, 
and zero otherwise 
 
JOBS Equals one if the company’s IPO date is on or after April 5, 2012, 
and zero otherwise 
 
ROApre Return on assets for the last fiscal year ended prior to the IPO, 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets (Source: Compustat) 
 
NWCpre Net working capital for the last fiscal year ended prior to the IPO, 
calculated as total current assets excluding cash and cash equivalents 
less total current liabilities, scaled by total assets (Source: 
Compustat) 
 
LEVERAGEpre Financial leverage for the last fiscal year ended prior to the IPO, 
calculated as total liabilities scaled by total assets (Source: 
Compustat) 
 
ATpre Total assets for the last fiscal year ended prior to the IPO 
 
OFFER_AMT IPO offer proceeds, calculated as the product of IPOPRICE and 
SHARES_OFFER (Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
TURNOVER IPO date share turnover, calculated as the number of shares traded 
on the IPO date relative to the total number of post-IPO shares 
outstanding (Source: www.nasdaq.com) 
 
INITIALRET IPO date return, calculated as the difference between the IPO date 
closing pricing and the IPO offer price, scaled by the IPO offer price 
(Sources: CRSP and www.nasdaq.com) 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
 
MKTVAL Market value of equity as of the IPO date, calculated as the IPO 
offer price times the post-IPO number of shares outstanding (Source: 
www.nasdaq.com) 
 
AU9550_PREV Equals one if the audit report in the most recent registration 
statement filed prior to the signature date of the Company’s audit 
report contains AU 9550 disclosure, and zero otherwise 
 
MILLS The inverse Mills’ ratio calculated from the estimation of Model 5 
 
ACCRUALpre Income statement accruals, calculated as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and operating cash flows, scaled 
by total assets for the last fiscal year ended prior to the IPO (Source: 
Compustat) 
 
OCFpre Operating cash flows divided by total assets for the last fiscal year 
ended prior to the IPO (Source: Compustat) 
 
 
 
